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MOZAMBIQUE: THE COSTS OF ‘OWNING’ AID  
Richard Batley
1
 
Abstract: Mozambique has only recently emerged from a long civil war; the national 
political process remains uncertain and the government apparatus is weak. Since its 
origin as an independent state, the country has been heavily aid-dependent, but the donor 
community has come to regard Mozambique as a positive case with a government that is 
receptive of new policies. In the name of increasing local ownership and of reducing the 
costs or burdens of dealing with multiple donors, most bilateral donors are seeking to 
channel more of their aid directly through government into sector and national budgets, 
instead of bypassing government through donor-led projects. However, this article argues 
that the immediate effect may be neither to reduce the costs of aid nor to increase the 
ownership of government. 
 
Introduction 
 
This study raises questions about the distribution of the costs of aid between donors and 
recipients. The channelling of donor resources directly into government budgets (whether 
to the treasury or to sector ministries) has been introduced, at least partly with the 
purpose of reducing the burdens on government and increasing its ‘ownership' of the aid 
process. The question is whether, given the imbalance of power and capacity between 
government and donors, donors really can let go the reins and allow government to 
assume control. There is the possibility of a paradoxical outcome where government 
does, indeed, take on more responsibility while also inviting donors into the heart of the 
governmental process. Increasing ownership is a more complex and longer-term process 
than improving aid coordination and shifting aid towards budget support.  Moreover, it is 
not clear that harmonized aid is, in all respects, less costly to government than project aid. 
This article refers to most of the categories of cost referred to in the Overview article: the 
transaction costs of coordination and administration and of converting to new forms of 
aid; political and institutional costs relating to ownership and capacity; and also the costs 
of managing risk. 
 
Method 
 
The study was undertaken in 2002 by interviewing elected and unelected officials of the 
Government of Mozambique and officials of the local donor community, and also by 
studying available documentation. Forty separate interviews were undertaken, equally 
between people working in government and in bilateral or multilateral aid agencies 
(Table 1). A follow up evaluation of ‘general budget support’ was undertaken in 2004 
and 2005. While this is not the focus of the current article, it did provide a basis for 
updating information from publicly available sources. 
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Table 1: Organizations interviewed 
Government 
- Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development 
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Cooperation 
- Ministry of Health 
- Ministry of Planning and Finance 
- Ministry of State Administration 
- Ministry of Transport and 
Communications 
- National Institute of Statistics 
- Administrative Tribunal 
- Unit for State Reform  
NGOs 
- Consilmo trade 
union congress 
- Grupo 
Moçambicano da 
Dívida 
- Oxfam 
- Progresso 
 
 
 
Donors 
- IMF 
- World Bank 
- European Union 
- UNDP 
- Embassies or aid agencies of  
Denmark 
France  
Germany 
Ireland 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
UK  
 
The social and economic context 
 
The first 25 years of Mozambique's history after independence in 1975 were marked by 
civil war, social and political disruption, and economic crisis. Upon the abrupt departure 
of the Portuguese, Mozambique was drawn into the independence struggles in South 
Africa and Rhodesia and into cold war alignments. The governing party, FRELIMO, 
supported the liberation movements, and, in turn, received backing from East European 
states. It adopted a Marxist-Leninist programme in 1977, establishing state-owned 
enterprises, farms and monopolies in external trade and domestic wholesale activity. The 
opposition, RENAMO, with its support particularly in the north of the country, emerged 
as a guerrilla resistance movement backed by the surrounding white régimes. Only in 
1992 did the parties enter into a peace accord leading to multi-party elections in 1994. A 
legacy of political hostility and mistrust remains (Hanlon 1991, Carbone 2002). 
 
There were, however, two positive features of this early experience. First, Mozambique 
built a strong relationship with the Nordic donors that supported its southern African 
strategy, gave aid, and eventually with the Netherlands, Switzerland and Canada formed 
the 'like-minded group' which has remained at the hub of advances in aid policy. 
Together with the UNDP, they were the most important funders of post-war resettlement, 
demobilization and elections (Rebelo 1998). Second, the shift from a statist towards a 
market economy began, at least apparently, on the government's own initiative, in 1983, 
before Mozambique joined the World Bank and IMF in 1984 and received its first 
structural adjustment loan in 1987 (Harvey 2002). Hanlon (1996) argues that this 
conversion was under pressure of donor 'strikes'. However, in regard both to economic 
policy and its poverty strategy, this is a government that at least claims 'ownership' of its 
reform. 
 
Mozambique was one of the poorest countries in the world at independence and income 
per head fell through the years of war. With a Gross National Income (GNI) per capita of 
$210, Mozambique is placed 171
st
 out of 177 countries in the UNDP Human 
Development Index for 2004. High economic growth has reduced the incidence of 
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poverty but from an extraordinarily high level. The National Household Survey shows 
that, of the population of 18.9 million, 54% live in absolute poverty (Economist 
Intelligence Unit 2004). Life expectancy is just 42 for women and 41 for men, and 
expected to worsen due to AIDS. The incidence of income poverty and poor access to 
social services and economic infrastructure are particularly high in the rural areas where 
80% of the population live. Social indicators show a poor situation by comparison with 
other least developed countries (Harvey 2002, Economist Intelligence Unit 2004).  
 
Since the peace agreement in 1992, economic growth rates have averaged 8.3% annually, 
dipping only in 2000 due to floods. However, much of this is accounted for by the 
catching-up process after the war, some 'mega' investment projects (for example the 
MOZAL aluminium plant, port and gas-field development) which have little direct effect 
on the population in terms of employment, and large scale donor assistance. 
 
On the whole, the government has successfully maintained the conditions that have 
attracted the continued support of the multilateral and bilateral aid agencies, which 
remain the main funders of the government's budget and account for most public 
investment. These conditions permitted Mozambique in 1999 to become the third country 
to reach the completion point in the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative process 
(HIPC). Since then, it has received the largest volume of debt relief. International 
financial institutions (IFIs) argue that this concession was due to the government 
following ‘good’ policies: liberalization, macro-economic stability and improvements in 
financial management matched by a shift of public spending towards an anti-poverty 
focus (World Bank 2001). Others argue that, at that time, the IFIs and donors 'desperately 
needed' a success case and were prepared to reward Mozambique, although there was 
little evidence of improved government performance or of poverty reduction (Hanlon 
2002b). 
 
Aid flows and aid dependence 
 
Table 2 presents the World Bank and OECD's estimates of net aid receipts (official 
development assistance - ODA). The figures are uncertain, for the reason that much aid is 
unrecorded and unknown to government, but Mozambique's heavy dependence 
particularly on bilateral donors is clear. Aid dependence was very high during the civil 
war period, reaching 87% of gross national income (GNI) in 1992 at the time of the 
Peace Agreement. In the late 1990s it dipped to below 30% and has continued at that 
level, except in 2002 when large-scale aid cancellations temporarily lifted aid to 60% of 
GNI. Mozambique remains the largest single recipient of foreign assistance in Africa. An 
indication of the significance of aid is that in 2003 donor support accounted for more than 
half of total public expenditure. 
 
This level of aid dependence makes government particularly vulnerable to donor 
pressures but also presents dilemmas to donors. On the one hand, there is a danger of 
misusing power by dominating the policy discussion and reducing government’s 
accountability to its own constituency. On the other hand, so high is the dependence that 
it is almost impossible for donors to impose conditions without creating macroeconomic 
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instability and putting the government budget into disarray, as the case of budget support 
set out below will show. 
 
Table 2: Aid as a percentage of gross national income in Mozambique 
 
 1990 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Net ODA ($ m) 1,002 1,200 1,064 888 948 1,040 805 877 933 2,058 1,066 
Bilateral share of ODA 43% 50% 33% 29% 28% 67% 43% 73% 75% 80% 66% 
Net ODA as % GNI 47% 60% 50% 33% 29% 28% 21% 25% 30% 60% 25% 
Net private flows ($ m)      87 85 103 115 70 -60 
Sources: http://www1.oecd.org/dac/images/AidRecipient/moz.gif / http://devdata.worldbank.org/query 
 
Government capacity 
 
The Mozambique Government confronts deep problems of national development and is 
also itself in a process of reform. Modelled on a combination of Portuguese 
administrative law and government structure together with a history of socialist 
ownership and planning, in the last 10 years the political system, public administration 
and policy have all been in a state of transformation. ‘Reformitis’ is said by some 
(Pavignani and Hauck 2001) to beset the small group of reform leaders in government, 
overwhelming the capacity of a weak government apparatus. Another view (Hanlon 
2002b) is that government simply adopts the rhetoric of donors’ reform objectives 
without really intending any radical change.  
 
Among the deeper underlying issues that affect the government’s capacity to direct policy 
and to integrate it into national systems and procedures are the problems of  
– A fragile democracy with a polarized party structure and a weak 
parliamentary system (Braathen and Orre 2001, Carbone 2002).  
– A high level of political and economic centralization, at the cost of the 
provincial and local governments of the northern and central regions. 
– Governmental administrative hierarchies that operate in ‘vertical silos’ from 
national to local level, cutting across attempts to plan resource allocation 
within and between sectors.  
– Extremely low levels of trained human resources. Fewer than 3% of all 
ministry officials are said to have university degrees (USAID 2004), 6% in the 
Ministry of Planning and Finance, and 4% in the Ministry of Health 
(Pavignani and Hauck 2001), and the skill level falls sharply at provincial and 
district levels (Gustaffson and Disch 2001). 
 
In terms of aid management, important developments have been 
– A poverty reduction strategy (known as the PARPA) was approved by 
government in 1999 and endorsed by the IMF and World Bank in 2001. This 
is claimed by both government and donors as the principal basis for their 
policy prioritization (Republic of Mozambique 2001, Francisco 2002). 
– Within the framework of the PARPA, instruments of financial management 
are being developed by government with the support of donors, including a 
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medium term fiscal framework, agreed budgetary procedures and quarterly 
reports of budget execution. 
– A joint process of target-setting and measurement was agreed by donors and 
government in 2004. This is based on a Performance Assessment Framework 
that sets out agreed targets (derived from the PARPA) that are the basis of 
decision by donors about their future disbursements of aid. 
 
The poverty reduction strategy, the new financial management procedures and the joint 
performance assessment are not only supported by donors but are also essential to 
donors’ own attempts to engage with government more strategically and systematically. 
Yet some donor practices continue to undermine government's capacity to plan and 
manage the allocation of resources. A large proportion of donor funding is 'off-budget', 
meaning that it is not applied through the Treasury but allocated direct to ministries, 
provinces, districts, or to donor projects that completely by-pass government. Only the 
external assistance that goes through the central bank (whether as Treasury budget 
support or to ministries) is fully known and recorded. Donors may hold accounts for 
funds that are committed to be used in Mozambique in overseas banks or in local 
commercial banks. There has been a systematic failure by most donors to pass 
comprehensive information on their planned and disbursed expenditure to the Ministry of 
Planning and Finance. Even the government’s own revenues are difficult to trace: much 
is collected directly and retained by public bodies, and not passed to the Treasury. Thus, 
the accounting system is said to cover between a quarter and a half of the resources being 
spent by government institutions (Gustaffson and Disch 2001).  
 
Donors, sector ministries and public agencies have implicitly colluded in guarding their 
own funding, fearing that finance allocated through the Treasury will be diverted to other 
ends. This issue is at the heart of the debate about channelling aid through sectoral and 
general budget support.  If funds could be channelled successfully through the budget, 
then this should not only improve budget management but also increase local control or 
‘ownership’. Donors and government have now committed themselves through the 
Performance Assessment Framework to addressing the problem. 
 
Donor harmonization 
 
A large number of donors operate in Mozambique. Francisco (2002) identifies 23 
significant bilateral donors with a string of smaller partners that make specific 
contributions; together they contribute 55% of (known) disbursed aid funds. In addition, 
23 multilateral agencies and up to 150 international NGOs offer grants, loans or technical 
assistance. 
 
The World Bank (2001) estimates that "most externally financed outlays - an estimated 
90 percent - are executed outside the normal budgetary procedures, following donor-
specific disbursing channels, classifications, procurement and reporting requirements…". 
Of this 90 percent, Francisco (2002) found that about 70 percent was allocated to stand-
alone projects, the rest being pooled in joint donor projects. The only external funding 
that was fully within normal budgetary procedures was the 10% which went as budget 
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support through the national Treasury; these direct budgetary allocations have been an 
unsteadily and slightly growing proportion of the whole of aid since 2000. 
 
There is a clear commitment, in principle, among most of the larger bilateral donors, 
supported by the IMF and World Bank, to move away from individually operated 
portfolios of projects and to 'harmonize' their aid with each other and sometimes with 
government. The spectrum of harmonized arrangements can be grouped into three broad 
forms: 
1. General budget support where donor funding contributes to the overall national 
budget, and not earmarked for specific sectors, although government and donors may 
together agree on priorities 
2. Sector budget support where donor funds are made available through the national 
budget, but notionally earmarked for specific sectors (in a 'sector-wide approach' or 
SWAp). In Mozambique, the established case is in agriculture but joint donor funds 
in health and education (as in 3 below) are also being brought 'on-budget' since the 
beginning of 2004. 
3. 'Basket funding' where donor funds are pooled and held in a special bank account for 
the exclusive use of a specific ministry (or part of a ministry's or a specific province's 
programme) outside the national budget and under the ultimate control of donors. 
Pooled support for the health and education sectors in Mozambique has been 
managed under this sort of arrangement. 
 
The majority of bilateral donors in Mozambique now subscribe to the principle of 
'harmonization' through some or all of these modalities. Many of the larger donors have 
committed 50% or more of their funding through various harmonized arrangements: 
Ireland, Finland, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom 
and the EU. Together with seven other bilateral donors and the World Bank, they 
comprise the 'Group of 16' that offers general budget support in a formal partnership with 
the Government of Mozambique. However, even within this group there are differences 
of opinion about the pace of commitment to budget support.  
                                                                                    
Governmental perspectives on aid  
 
This section asks how far alternative forms of aid reduce or enhance governmental 
ownership. For the meaning of 'ownership', this article will adopt the definition in the 
study by Pavignani and Hauck (2001): "….based on domestically developed policies and 
rooted in national systems and procedures." However, this definition leaves open the 
question - which this article will not address - whose ownership nationally is to be 
strengthened: Is it the executive or the legislative arm of government? Is it politicians or 
officials? Is it central or local government? Is it the Ministry of Planning and Finance or 
the sector ministries?  
 
In the study on which this article is based, most government political leaders and officials 
and most leading donors argued the case against project aid and in favour of increased 
harmonization of aid between donors and its alignment with government procedures. For 
these the aim is a 'coordinated policy dialogue' based on the government's poverty 
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strategy and the development of shared accounting and disbursement mechanisms that 
conform with the government's own mechanisms of financial management, resulting in 
greater effectiveness and lower transaction costs. There is a counter-view: some donor 
and government officials argue that non-harmonized project aid is positive because it is 
more likely to be administered effectively by donors, impose fewer administrative 
demands on government, reach targeted poor populations, and keep donors in touch with 
grass-roots realities. There may also be individual benefits from project aid: government 
officials employed on the project may receive increased salaries and perks. 
 
Government officials (from middle managers to ministers) who were interviewed for this 
study overwhelmingly mentioned the 'burdens' presented by project aid that bypassed 
national systems and priorities, provided little information to government, and required 
numerous reports to several donors (Table 3). The most fundamental concern was that 
raised by all four Mozambican ministers who were interviewed; they emphasized the 
effect of project aid in fragmenting ministries, weakening national and ministerial 
identity, and undermining authority. In interview, the Minister of Health described the 
MOH as having become a ‘ministry of projects’ in which officials dealt with different 
donors, competing with each other and owing their loyalty to the funder. But 
interviewees were often reluctant to seem to 'complain' and risk future donor support. 
Basket, sector and budget support were their preferred solution in principle, but most 
respondents also accepted the possibility of making the best of stand-alone projects, and 
of trying to bring them within the framework of government strategy. 
 
Table 3: The main burdens presented by project aid, according to government 
officials 
 
Problems mentioned Number of mentions 
Lack of fit with national priorities and systems, 
undermining authority 
8 
Lack of information given to government especially on 
donor funding allocations 
7 
Excessive demands on time of multiple reports and 
meetings 
6 
Off-budget spending bypasses government 6 
Inconsistency between donors 3 
Unpredictability of aid flows 1 
Exceptional salaries 1 
Desire for attribution/visibility of aid 1 
 
Government officials interviewed also recognized that harmonized arrangements, and 
particularly sector and general budget support, carried with them their own new demands. 
The agricultural sector-wide approach (SWAp) had taken around five years to develop; in 
health and education, negotiations about forming SWAps were concluded only after 
several years. The involvement of donors in budget support and SWAps had led them to 
make increased demands on government for consultation in policy-making, the reform of 
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financial management systems, and improvements in government reporting and 
monitoring. 
 
The costs of alternative forms of aid 
 
Aid is a benefit that carries costs, and there is a trade-off between the costs and the 
benefits of different forms of aid. Harmonization between donors and government may 
not increase government ownership, and it may reduce some costs or burdens on 
government but increase others. Greater ownership does not necessarily reduce costs or 
increase short-term aid effectiveness. The trade-offs become clearer if costs are broken 
down into the following types: 
- administrative costs of directly delivering aid  
- coordination costs of  negotiating with and managing relations with donors 
- conversion costs of moving from one form of aid instrument to another 
- risks of failure inherent in alternative aid instruments 
- costs of assurance management to manage the risks. 
 
Table 4 summarizes the trade-off of benefits and costs or risks to government between 
alternative forms of aid. The table is structured in a hierarchy from (at the top) aid 
instruments where individual donors act autonomously and outside government to 
increasingly higher levels of coordination and alignment with government practices. This 
culminates (at the bottom) in general budget support where donors collectively disburse 
their funds into the government budget rather than into separate projects. However, the 
table indicates that, while 'ownership deficiencies' and coordination costs may decrease, 
other costs may grow - at least in the short-term. 
 
Deficiency of domestic ownership is likely to be highest where donors (individually or 
together) manage their own projects and lowest where donors operate through sector or 
national budget frameworks. There are intermediary stages where donors set up a joint 
management arrangement, or where they pool their resources and coordinate with 
government allocations. 
 
Coordination costs, in terms of the administrative complexities of negotiating and 
reporting on multiple donor interventions, are clearly highest where donors operate 
separately from each other and from government. The more they pool project support or 
put funds into budgets, the lower are these costs to government. 
 
Administrative costs for government are lowest where the donors directly deliver project 
aid, whether alone, in coordination or managed by an agent. The more the government 
assumes ownership, the more it also acquires the costs of administering delivery. 
 
Conversion costs are incurred where new forms of aid are developed and donors and 
government have to work out new relationships. The government is familiar with 
established forms of project aid, but pooling arrangements, sector-wide approaches and 
general budget support may require a lot of planning and years of evolution.  
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Risks of failure grow as donors and government become increasingly interdependent. The 
concertation of aid between donors and with government makes each more vulnerable to 
changes of policy or failures to disburse, as the next section will illustrate. 
 
Costs of assurance management: To cover themselves against these risks, donors and 
government make demands on each other for assurance that their side of the bargain will 
be kept.  As they move away from management of their own projects and instead seek to 
operate through the government’s own mechanisms, donors in Mozambique have become 
more aware of deficiencies in the government’s capacity of financial management, 
human resource and administrative systems. They have required reforms as a part of the 
package of general budget support. The government, in its turn, has demanded guarantees 
of the donors’ agreed conditions for disbursement. 
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Table 4: Distribution of costs to government between alternative aid instruments 
 
Aid 
instrument 
Ownership 
deficiency 
Coordination 
costs 
Admin costs Conversion 
costs 
Risks of 
failure 
Costs of 
assurance 
 
Single donor-
led projects 
High 
 
 
 
High 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Low 
High 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
Low 
 
Low 
 
 
 
Low 
 
 
 
 
Low 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
High 
Low 
 
 
 
Low 
 
 
 
 
Low 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
High 
Low 
 
 
 
Low 
 
 
 
 
Low 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
High 
Low 
 
 
 
Low 
     
 
 
 
Low 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
High 
 
Autonomous 
donors in 
coordination 
 
Donor 
cordination 
by common 
agent 
(e.g.UNDP) 
 
Basket 
funding 
 
Donor 
support to 
sector 
budgets 
Donor 
support to 
general 
budget 
Note: This table is a schematic representation of a complex reality.  
 
Budget support 
 
As the last section showed, there is no definitive 'good practice' that does not present 
some disadvantage in terms of costs or demands on government (or on donors). 
Mozambique has effective cases of aid coordination, basket funding, common support for 
sector budgets, and general budget support. This section will illustrate the opportunities 
and costs of general budget support, which is seen by its advocates as the highest form of 
harmonization between donors and alignment with government - the only way of truly 
working through core government processes.  
 
A Joint Macro-Financial Aid Programme was agreed in 1999 between the Government of 
Mozambique and nine bilateral donors - Belgium, Denmark, the European Commission, 
Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. In November 2000, 
the donors and government signed a 'common framework agreement'. The written nature 
of the donor commitment and the way that this has evolved to clarify the mutual 
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obligations of government and donors was said by several donors and the IMF to make 
this a particularly positive case by comparison with other African countries. Within 
Mozambique, this 'programme aid partnership' has become the focus of all donor 
dialogue with the government. By the end of 2004, a further seven donors had joined the 
club: Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and the World Bank. Other 
donors - the UN, African Development Bank, IMF, USAID, Japan and Spain - 
collaborate with the budget support partners but as observers. 
 
The roots of this partnership can be traced back to the 1980s when some donors 
organized import support programmes for essential goods. As the economy was 
liberalized and controls on importation and on access to capital were abolished, donors 
replaced specific import support with debt relief and balance of payments support to meet 
the general gap in external payments. With the move to a market-determined exchange 
rate, balance of payments support, in its turn, became inappropriate since the exchange 
rate would now operate as the ultimate balancing mechanism.  
 
The next step was to shift to the direct injection of resources first into sector ministry 
budgets and then into the government's general budget with the overall goal of 
'contributing to poverty reduction'. The approval by the government of its full poverty 
reduction strategy in April 2001 and governmental commitments to improved budgeting 
and financial management made this possible. In return for their core budget support, the 
donors place expectations on government: progress in the poverty reduction programme, 
appropriate reforms in government budgeting and financial management, a process of 
'dialogue' about reforms and policies, and joint review of performance.  
 
The mechanisms of the engagement go in an annual cycle.  
 April: Annual Review of performance over the previous financial year and up to the 
point of the review against the government's economic and social plan, the joint 
performance assessment framework (PAF) and the state budget. The review leads to a 
joint Aide Memoire assessing performance and making recommendations. Assessed 
performance is the basis for future donor commitments regarding support for the 
following year's budget. 
- June: follow up meeting 
 August/September: Mid-year Review focusing on forward planning and budgeting for 
the next financial year, and agreement on the basis of the following year's 
performance targets. This takes place in time to influence the submission of the 
government's social and economic plan and the state budget to parliament. Progress 
of the government against the current year's economic and social plan, PAF and 
budget, and of the donor partners against their commitments are also reviewed.   
- December: follow up meeting. Donors confirm their disbursement schedules 
 A joint Budget Working Group of donor and government economists meets, in 
combination with these review meetings, to discuss budget execution and donor 
disbursement performance. 
 Donor groups met fortnightly or monthly throughout the year: the heads of 
cooperation, a steering group of the 'programme aid partners', an economists working 
group, sector working groups, and a PAF coordination group. 
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In principle, donors and government regard this partnership as beneficial. It reduces the 
burdens on government by coordinating donors' conditions and demands, information 
requirements, performance measures and standards for reporting and audit. Bilateral The 
donors' coordination is extended by the participation of the IMF and World Bank in 
partners' meetings. While the international financial institutions concentrate on issues of 
macroeconomic stability, the bilateral donors focus on the other conditions required of 
government - better financial management, redirection of spending to social sectors, 
revenue mobilization, and decentralization. From the government's point of view, there 
are clear benefits in the greater conformity of donors with national priorities and in the 
common voice with which donors speak.  
 
However, there are also costs. First, the demands on government for improved financial 
management and reporting, however valid, are certainly heavier. Second donors' common 
voice can become a 'common front' in an unbalanced power relationship, especially 
where donors agree together to withhold disbursement. Since the government has no 
spare financial capacity, the joint withholding of support by donors would immediately 
threaten the government's entire budget and the country's financial and economic 
stability. 
 
The issue arose in 2001 when the partnership donors agreed briefly to suspend 
disbursement in response to a crisis in the banking sector. Two previously government-
owned banks - the Banco Comercial de Moçambique and Banco Austral - were part-sold 
to the private sector, and then became insolvent under the weight of bad debts incurred 
mainly when they were in public ownership. The government borrowed to re-capitalize 
the banks; it re-possessed the Banco Austral, arguing against liquidation on the grounds 
that this would prejudice the 340,000 depositors, but then made slow progress in 
recovering the debts. There followed assassinations of a journalist who was investigating 
the scandals and of the acting head of the Banco Austral who was seeking repayment of 
debts (Hanlon 2002b). The donors demanded prosecution of the criminals, improved 
bank supervision, and a series of specific conditions regarding loan recovery. In the face 
of continued failure to recover non-performing loans and to address human rights issues, 
certain donors – particularly the Nordic countries – held out for continued suspension of 
disbursement. The Nordic donors revived this demand in 2002, but were overridden by 
the others.   
 
There are other risks and uncertainties for government. While donors disburse into a 
common account, their individual timing for doing so is not entirely predictable. For 
example, in the case of the EC in 2001, administrative problems in Brussels led to a four-
month delay in disbursement. In the face of the damaging effect of late and uncertain 
disbursement on macro-financial management, the government supported by the IMF 
called on the donors to provide clear and agreed criteria against which disbursement 
would be decided. In response, at the beginning of 2004, a new Memorandum of 
Understanding was drawn up between government and donors. A central tenet is that, 
once funds are committed for the financial year, disbursements should follow as 
scheduled unless there has been a fundamental breach of agreed basic principles to do 
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with human rights, probity, independence of the judiciary, democratic political processes, 
poverty focus and sound macro-economic policies. However, these principles still leave 
plenty of room for interpretation. 
 
There is a debate among donors about the speed of advance towards fuller budget 
support. The British, Dutch, IMF and EU are more inclined to place trust in the capacity 
of the government to manage budget resources, and to risk failures - "We can only 
improve the budgetary system by using it". The Nordic nations and the Swiss aim in the 
same direction but anticipate a longer period (5 to 10 years) of transition as government 
performance improves – the ‘building-blocks approach’ in which budget support and 
sector support go hand-in-hand towards a future in which both are integrated into a 
national financial management system. The concern of this second sub-group is that too 
rapid a commitment to budget support will stretch the capacity of the government and 
present problems of fiduciary risk. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Mozambique is a special case, both in terms of its history of close association with some 
donors and in terms of the level of donor coordination and collaboration that has been 
achieved. It is seen by many donors as a trial case for approaches that could be applied 
elsewhere. The objectives of new forms of aid management are to ‘harmonize’ the 
practices of donors and donors with government, and thereby to reduce the costs of aid 
management and increase local ‘ownership’ of the aid process. However, the indications 
of this study in Mozambique are that harmonization, ownership and reduced costs are not 
necessarily compatible goals, at least in the short-term.  
 
Harmonization through pooling, sector and budget support may reduce certain costs to 
government but increase others. It is clear that the Government of Mozambique wants to 
move gradually towards sector and budget support, on grounds of ownership and the 
reduced transaction costs of dealing with multiple donors. Budget support does, at the 
very least, align the policies and management procedures of government and donors. It 
may also increase local control in the sense that it channels resources through regular 
budgetary processes which are then subject to national political systems. However, with 
these possible advantages come certain risks and costs. Depending on the strength of the 
national system, budget support may increase ‘ownership’ by government or it might be 
seen rather as introducing donors more deeply into the heart of government. It is likely 
that the immediate effect on government is to impose new costs of administration, of 
conversion to new approaches, and of responding to the enhanced demands of donors on 
government for ever deeper reform. There is also the increased risk of collective donor 
decisions to withhold aid. Working out the arrangements for mutual assurance becomes a 
major focus of aid management under budget support. 
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